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Negotiation is a process in which parties interact to settle
a mutual concern to improve their status quo. Traditionally,
negotiation is a necessary, but time-consuming and expen-
sive activity. Therefore, in the last two decades, there has
been a growing interest in the automation of negotiation.
One of the key challenges for a successful negotiation is
that usually only limited information is available about the
opponent. Although sharing private information can result
in mutual gains, negotiators often avoid this to prevent ex-
ploitation. This problem can be partially overcome by de-
riving information from the opponent’s actions. Exploiting
this information to learn aspects of the opponent is called
opponent modeling. Creating an accurate opponent model
is a key factor in improving the quality of the outcome and
can further increase the benefits of automated negotiation.
Despite the advantages of opponent modeling and two
decades of research, there is no recent study that provides
an overview of the field. Therefore, in order to stimulate
the development of efficient future opponent models, and to
outline a research agenda, we provide an overview of existing
opponent models in bilateral negotiation [2]. As our main
contributions, we classify opponent models using a compre-
hensive taxonomy and provide recommendations on how to
select the best model depending on the negotiation setting.
2. LEARNING ABOUT THE OPPONENT
A bilateral negotiation may be viewed as a two-player
game of incomplete information. An opponent model is then
simply an abstracted description of a player (and/or their
behavior) during the game. In negotiation, opponent mod-
eling often revolves around three concerns: what does the
opponent want ; what will the opponent do; and what type of
player is the opponent. These considerations are often highly
related; for example, to understand the opponent’s behavior,
an agent first needs to know what the opponent desires.
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An important aspect in which opponent models differ is
their time of creation. Oﬄine opponent models are con-
structed before the negotiation using historical data. Online
opponent models are constructed during the negotiation by
interpreting the exchange of offers. A major challenge for
online models are real-time deadlines, which impose a re-
striction on the time available for maintaining the model.
Even though there are large differences between opponent
models, there is a common set of motivations for using them:
1. Minimize negotiation cost. It costs time and re-
sources to negotiate and as a consequence, early agree-
ments are often preferred. Learning can aid in identi-
fying promising bids that lead to swift agreements.
2. Adapt to the opponent. Agents can adapt their be-
havior according to their opponent; e.g., by estimating
the deadline or reservation value in an attempt to press
for an outcome the opponent will ultimately settle for.
3. Reach win-win agreements. In a cooperative envi-
ronment, agents aim for a fair result. An estimate of
the opponent’s preference profile can aid in identifying
mutually beneficial outcomes.
We found that existing work can fulfill these goals by learn-
ing a combination of four opponent attributes listed below.
Acceptance Strategy
The decision to accept an offer is made by the acceptance
strategy of a negotiating agent. Upon acceptance of an of-
fer, the negotiation ends in agreement; otherwise, the agents
continue exchanging offers. Learning an opponent’s accep-
tance strategy is potentially of great value as it can help to
find the deal with the highest utility that is still acceptable
for the opponent.
In negotiations about a single, quantitative issue (such as
the price of a service), where the opponent’s have opposing
preferences that are publicly known, estimating the reserva-
tion value is sufficient to determine all acceptable bids. The
reservation value can be learned by extrapolating the oppo-
nent’s concessions, for example by applying Bayesian learn-
ing. Alternatively, a model may assume that the opponent
uses a particular decision function of which the unknown
variables can be estimated using non-linear regression.
In multi-issue negotiations, we can estimate the probabil-
ity of acceptance for every possible outcome. By keeping
track of what offers were offered and accepted in previous
negotiations, an agent can estimate the probability that a
bid will be accepted. As it is unlikely that such an estimate
can be derived for all possible bids, regression methods can
be applied to determine the acceptance probability for the
entire outcome space.
Deadline
The deadline of a negotiation refers to the time before which
an agreement must be reached which is better than the best
alternative for each party. Each agent can have their own
private deadline, but it is also common for the negotiation
deadline to be shared. The deadline may be specified as a
maximum number of rounds, or alternatively as a real-time
cutoff point.
Private deadlines are important to learn about, as an
agent is likely to concede strongly near the deadline to avoid
non-agreement. Because of the strong connection with the
reservation value, most of the procedures to learn the reser-
vation value can also be applied here.
Preference Profile
The preference profile of an agent represents the private
valuation of possible negotiation outcomes. Learning the
preference profile assists in locating mutually beneficial out-
comes and recognizing potential for meaningful concessions.
Four approaches have been used so far to estimate the
opponent’s preference information:
1. Importance of the issues. It is often easier to esti-
mate the weight of all issues under negotiation, rather
than the preference over all outcomes. The idea is
to analyze the opponent’s concessions, assuming that
stronger concessions are made on issues that are valued
less.
2. Classify the negotiation trace. Given the oppo-
nent’s negotiation actions, we can determine which op-
ponent type is most likely, and subsequently apply a
classification algorithm to categorize preferences of the
opponent.
3. Aggregate negotiation data. When oﬄine data is
available, we can derive the opponent’s preference pro-
file from a large database of negotiation traces from
similar – but not identical – opponents.
4. Importance of outcomes. A popular technique is
the frequency analysis heuristic. The main idea is that
preferred values of an issue are offered relatively more
often in a negotiation trace. For the issue weights, the
opposite holds: an issue is likely unimportant if its
value changes often.
Bidding Strategy
The negotiation strategy determines an agent’s offer in any
given negotiation state. Strategies may range from sim-
ple time-dependent concessions to complex decision-making
that depends on the opponent’s behavior. Learning the op-
ponent’s bidding strategy allows an agent to anticipate and
manipulate the opponent’s behavior.
An agent is generally unaware of the opponent’s exact
strategy, but it might have knowledge about the type of
strategy used. If such knowledge can be captured in a closed-
form formula with unknown variables, regression analysis
can be applied.
When limited knowledge is available about the opponent’s
type, time series forecasting is an alternative, which is a
technique to extrapolate a set of observations that is se-
quentially ordered in time. In negotiation, the time series
typically consists of the utilities of offers received. Learning
the opponent’s bidding strategy then boils down to creating
a forecast of future offers, using a set of statistical techniques
and smoothing methods.
3. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Constructing an opponent model may be viewed as a clas-
sification problem, where the type of the opponent needs to
be determined from a range of possibilities. In combina-
tion with opponent classification, there are two other oppo-
nent model categories: models that learn what the opponent
wants, in terms of its reservation value, deadline, and pref-
erences, and secondly, models that learn what the opponent
will do, in terms of the bidding and acceptance strategy.
A large number of opponent modeling techniques exist in
literature. For each learned opponent attribute, we have
identified key approaches that are currently being applied.
A natural question that arises with regard to agent design
is: which of the depicted modeling techniques is best? To
date, answering this question is unfeasible, as most authors
evaluate opponent models in their own specific setting using
different quality measures. A main direction for future work
is therefore to outline a procedure for finding the best oppo-
nent modeling technique given the particular circumstances.
A fair procedure should consist of two components: a bal-
anced experimental setup to evaluate the model under dif-
ferent conditions, together with an unbiased set of quality
measures [1]. Performance measures are the most commonly
used quality measure; they determine the performance gain
when a negotiation strategy is supplemented by a learning
method, for example the increase in average utility. Accu-
racy measures quantify how closely the model resembles re-
ality, e.g. by calculating the correlation between the actual
and estimated utilities of all outcomes. Both approaches
augment each other, and in [2] we discuss for each of the
four opponent attributes that are learned which measures
to apply. In addition, for each of the three reasons for using
an opponent model (c.f. Section 2) we recommend a set of
corresponding performance measures.
Consistently applying the right negotiation benchmarks
would greatly improve comparability of results in negotia-
tion literature, and would provide insight in possible im-
provements to existing models and how they can be com-
bined to augment each other. Our work serves as a start-
ing point towards finding the best opponent modeling tech-
niques, and thereby the transition from theory to practice.
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